Тестовый вопрос
Consider a game with an entrant and an incumbent. The entrant moves first, and the incumbent observes this decision. The entrant can either enter the market or stay out. If the entrant stays out, the game ends with the entrant receiving a payoff of 0 and the incumbent receiving a payoff of 3. If the entrant enters the market, the incumbent must decide whether to prevent or allow entry. If the incumbent prevents entry, the entrant receives -2, and the incumbent receives −1. If the incumbent allows entry, the entrant receives 3, and the incumbent receives 2. What are the payoffs for each player if they both follow their optimal strategy?
This game can be solved by backward induction. The incumbent decides to allow the entry because it receives 2 instead of −1 (if it prevents the entry). The entrant decides: if it says out, it receives 0, if it enters, it receives 3. Entrant decides to enter.